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Editor’s Note 
Padraig O’Malley 
Since the last volume of the New England Journal of Public Policy, the issue of migrants 
making their way to Europe along treacherous routes, many not surviving the perilous journey, 
has befuddled the countries in the European Union (EU). As the situation became more desperate 
and the influx accelerated, hospitality began to wear thin. European leaders began to close their 
national borders, threatening the foundations of the EU itself—the Schengen agreement—free 
travel across national borders. The blitz of bombings in Paris by the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) in November 2015 brought a new frenzy of hand-wringing: what if there were 
ISIL cells or even lone wolves coming from Syria or Iraq among the teeming crowds? In the 
United States people terrified themselves into hysteria, vehemently opposing the prospect of 
allowing twenty thousand Syrian refugees who would undergo security checks over a two-year 
period before they would qualify for entry into the country. Most of the current flow of refugees 
that has created a crisis among the EU’s member states are fleeing the brutal ravages of the 
Syrian civil war, the ongoing war in Iraq, and the Afghanistan quagmire that appears as much 
beholden to the Taliban as ever. Hence this editor’s note that focuses on migration and conflict. 
From the time Homo sapiens began to explore the limits of planet earth, conflict and 
migration have been inextricably intertwined, beginning with conflict over resources to survive, 
later for control of territory. In the first half of the twentieth century two devastating world wars 
scattered migrants in any direction they thought they might find refuge; after a postwar lull, 
migration became more pronounced in the latter years of the twentieth century and inexorably so 
since the opening decades of the twenty-first.  
Wars are no longer waged by nation-states against one another; they are intrastate conflicts. 
They are waged by warlords, by governments against their own people, by authoritarian rulers 
clinging to power, by ethnic groups settling historical scores, by minorities within nation-states 
demanding self-determination; they are caused by religious differences and clashing ideologies; 
they erupt in weak or failing states where a concatenation of factors has eroded the authority of 
the state. We now include rape as a weapon of war, food as a weapon of war, and the acts of 
child-soldiers as part of our definition of war. Often more die fleeing war than in war itself. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ratio of combatants to civilians killed in war 
was 8:1—eight combatants for every civilian. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
figures were reversed; the ratio was 1:8—eight civilians were killed for every combatant. In the 
space of a hundred years, war had been redefined—people with weapons of war now kill 
unarmed civilians, not each other. Today you are safer being a soldier in one of the competing 
armies or militias than being a civilian. Armies no longer “fight” on behalf of people; they kill 
people. And the people flee. 
 
Africa’s World War 
 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—an oxymoron if ever there were one—the 
largest and deadliest war since World War II was fought in the mid-1990s between coalitions of 
African nations (at one point nine African nations were involved), ethnic tribes, communal 
groups, and meandering gangster marauders. More than 1 million people—almost all civilians—
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were killed in “combat”; another 1.5 million died fleeing shifting battlegrounds or psychotic 
plunderers. 
In Rwanda another million were butchered by Hutu attacks on Tutsis in the genocide 
overlooked by the West. Over two million civilians fled into neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, and 
the DRC. (Many returned after normality settled in.) 
African refugees died of thirst and lack of food and shelter, victims of hostile environments 
in unforgiving terrain. Most of those fleeing became either internally displaced persons (IDPs)—
people who are effectively “internal refugees” within their own country—or refugees, crossing 
porous borders from one poor country to a neighboring poor country. But there were no 
television cameras to record the indescribable horrors of these hazardous routes from one 
country to another, and what does not exist on videotape has not happened. In the West the 
mention of the DRC merely raises quizzical looks. The West pays attention to the global crisis of 
migration only when the West itself comes under threat from massive inflows. 
Population upheavals intensified in Africa during the 1990s. About 13.7 million Africans 
remained uprooted (IDPs and refugees combined) at the end of the 1990s compared with about 
12 million in 1990. But in the next fifteen years the number of IDPs increased dramatically. 
Although the number of refugees declined by about one-third during the 1990s, the number IDPs 
jumped from 7 million to about 10 million.  
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the total 
number of refugees estimated for all of Africa as of June 2015 is 2,561,564. The countries 
hosting the largest number of refugees are Ethiopia (highest), Kenya, Chad, Uganda, Cameroon, 
Sudan, and South Sudan; the countries from which most refugees flee are Somalia, Central 
African Republic, DRC, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan, and smaller but significant numbers 
are from Burundi, Mali, and Nigeria. All are war-driven refugees.  
The highest displacement numbers are IDPs. As of June 2015 there are 11.4 million IDPs in 
Africa, 4.5 million of whom were newly displaced in 2014. Not included in these figures is an 
additional 3.3 million IDPs in Nigeria. Nigeria currently hosts the highest number of IDPs in 
Africa.  
Boko Haram spreads chaos and fear in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. The Lake Chad Basin 
is the fastest-growing displacement crisis in Africa; 2.7 million people, 1.5 million of them 
children, have been uprooted by Boko Haram terrorists. In Kenya and Somalia, al-Shabaab 
performs a similar function; Niger, desperately poor, shares troubled borders with Algeria, Chad, 
Libya, and Mali. Libya is in freefall and also a destination for refugees fleeing other parts of 
Africa and seeking hazardous sea routes to Europe; al-Qaeda has tentacles across the region, in 
Niger, and the fingerprints of ISIL in a dozen countries sow fear in their populations and set in 
motion the march of refugees after their random attacks. 
Kenya “hosts” the largest refugee camp in the world. The UNHCR set up Dadaab in the 
desert in 1991 for 90,000 refugees escaping Somalia’s civil war. The camp now has over 
350,000 residents, who live in a space of less than fifty square kilometers, “roughly as if the 
entire population of Cleveland, Ohio, were forced to live in an area smaller than the Ohio State 
University campus.”1 Kenya claims that members of al-Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group, have 
infiltrated the camp and have repeatedly threatened to shut it down. Were it to do so, a 
humanitarian disaster would follow. 
The living conditions of the displaced vary among and within the countries listed earlier. 
Conditions also vary by shelter type, whether overcrowded formal camps or makeshift shelters 
where refugees endure multiple displacements and frequent attacks by armed fighters. Common 
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among all are water shortages, poor medical care, severe malnutrition and risk of famine, and 
hygiene and exposure to water-borne diseases. Women and children are vulnerable to sexual 
violence, and children have little access to education and risk being taken as child soldiers. In 
addition to armed violence, they remain vulnerable to climate-related exposure, to droughts and 
sudden floods. Many fear returning home or have no home left to return to. The uncertainty of 
finding a passage to Europe, risk-ridden as it may be, outweighs the absence of a future that 
awaits them if they continue to live in the camps, and many follow well-trodden routes: either 
the western route, the main route for refugees and IDPs from Mali, Gambia, and Senegal, or the 
western route in the Sahel that frequently crosses and connects with the central route, for which 
the source countries are Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger. The eastern route, the preferred route for 
refugees and IDPs from Somalia, Eritrea, and Darfur in South Sudan, cuts north through Sudan 
and Egypt and extends along the northern coast of Africa. All routes converge in the Maghreb, 
and in recent years mostly in Libya, where the refugees attempt a sea crossing to Italy. 
 
A Global Glance 
 
In 2002, there were twenty-one major armed conflicts in nineteen locations around the world. By 
2008, according to the Armed Conflict Survey (ACS), there were sixty-three armed conflicts 
around the world producing 56,000 fatalities, whereas in 2014 there were only forty-two armed 
conflicts producing 180,000 fatalities. Though “the number of armed conflicts around the world 
has been progressively declining since the Armed Conflict Database was launched, . . . the 
decline in the number of conflicts has been more than compensated for by an inexorable rise in 
the intensity of violence associated with them.” But, the ACS asserts, “the impact of conflict 
cannot simply be judged by the number of fatalities and injuries to which it gives rise. The 
conflicts being covered are generating ever higher levels of refugees and IDPs, leading the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees to observe that 2013 was the first year since the end of the 
Second World War when the global number of displaced persons had exceeded 50 million.”2  
In 2016, the number is 60 million.3  
In 2014, according to the United Nations, some 14 million people were forced from their 
homes in armed conflicts worldwide, and much of the huge increase was due to the wars in Syria 
and Iraq, with Afghanistan lagging not far behind. In Syria, more than half of the prewar 
population of 22 million is now uprooted, as either new refugees or IDPs. In the first four months 
of 2015 alone, another 700,000 fled, many to nearby countries, the highest rate of any time 
during the war. In the countries that border Syria, the flow of refugees into stuffed camps 
threatens the stability of the states themselves: in Turkey, over 2.5 million refugees; in Lebanon, 
over 1.3 million—more than 25 percent of Lebanon’s fragile confessional balance; in Jordon, 
over 750,000. 
The most dramatic increase occurred in the number of IDPs. At least 38 million people were 
internally displaced at the end of 2015, compared with 21.2 million at the turn of the century. In 
a report published in 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center writes: “Never . . . from 
the peak of the Darfur crisis in 2004 and the sectarian violence in Iraq in the mid to late 2000s to 
the uprisings of the ‘Arab spring’ in 2011 and the ensuing crises in the Middle East have we 
reported such a high estimate for the number of people newly displaced in a year. Today there 
are almost twice as many IDPs as there are refugees worldwide.”4  
The growing number of IDPs is a problem with which the international community has not 
come to grips. The displaced are often cut off from international humanitarian aid and protection 
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because of a lack of security, difficult logistics, or restricted access imposed by the country’s 
government. IDPs are usually trapped in some of the world’s most dangerous places, non-people 
in their own countries, where marginalization is usually the common condition of most. Hence, 
displacement is a springboard for migration. 
David Miliband, president and CEO of the International Rescue Committee, referring to 
IDPs worldwide, said it is “very, very important . . . to recognize that those 40 million people are 
tomorrow’s refugees.5 
 
Europe: Fear and Loathing 
 
The period 2010–2015 brought a series of new realities. While African refugees continued to 
account for over 50 percent of the world’s refugees, the migration was mainly among African 
countries themselves and never a matter of much concern to the West—a humanitarian disaster 
in its eyes but not an issue that affected its national security interests.  
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, post–Arab Spring upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, the civil war in Syria and the emergence of ISIL and other Islamic 
groups, some with fealty to ISIL and others to al-Qaeda, resulted in a fundamental change in the 
relationship of the EU to its migrant populations that threatens to change the character of the EU 
itself and may be the death knell for border-free travel across the EU. Adding to the desperation, 
the World Food Program has run out of money in Syria and UNCHR has cut allowances to 
refugees in the camps in Jordan and Turkey by half, to the edge of subsistence. In the absence of 
adequate security, an increasing number of UN agencies, the Committee of the Red Cross, and 
NGOs will withdraw, at least temporarily, from particularly dangerous humanitarian operations.6 
Hence, the flow of migrants to EU shores is ceaseless, despite the hazards for refugees from 
Bodrum, Izmir Smyrna, and Mersin in Turkey who make the crossing in dinky, overcrowded 
rubber boats to the Greek islands of Kos, Lesbos, and Leros, or for refugees from poverty-ridden 
camps in African countries who undertake the hazardous journey to reach Tripoli and Benghazi 
in the hope of securing a passage to Malta or Italy. 
 
“Many of these frail, artificial states [in the Middle East and Africa],” New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman observes,  
 
don’t correspond to any ethnic, cultural, linguistic or demographic realities. They are 
caravan homes in a trailer park—built on slabs of concrete without real foundations or 
basement —and what you’re seeing today with the acceleration of technology, climate 
change stresses and globalization is the equivalent of a tornado going through a trailer 
park. Some of these states are just falling apart, and many of their people are now trying to 
cross the Mediterranean—to escape their world of disorder and get into the world of order, 
particularly the European Union.  
 
Mid-year 2015, 1.2 million migrants, mainly from Syria and Iraq had entered the EU—a 
fourfold increase over the previous year. Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany 
was prepared to give asylum to one million refugees. But as the rate at which refugees were 
arriving overwhelmed the country’s abortive capacity to process them, Europe’s welcome turned 
sour. The outer-perimeter countries erected barriers; some sealed their borders. Public support in 
Germany for Merkel’s “open door” policy eroded and rebellion in the ranks of her own party—
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the Christian Democratic Party—forced her hand, and Germany imposed constraints in January 
2016.7 In mid-January 2015 Austria suspended the Schengen agreement. Announcing the 
measure, Chancellor Werner Faymann said: “If the EU does not manage to secure its external 
borders, Schengen as a whole is put into question. . . . Then each country must control its own 
national borders.” He added, “In the event of their not being controlled in the near future, the 
whole EU [will be] in question.”8 
What is the refugee crisis in the EU? Surely, it cannot be the numbers—the absorption of 
slightly more than 1 million refugees into a population of 372 million. The interaction of many 
factors creates an iterative process that feeds on itself. No differentiation was made between 
economic migrants and migrants fleeing terror and persecution. Huge inflows of Muslims 
inspired fear that the social fabric of nation-states will change. These refuges were seen as threats 
to national labor markets in a Europe that had not fully recovered from the 2008 recession and 
where unemployment rates remained stubbornly high. The impacts of the Paris bombings by 
ISIL in October 2015 reverberated across the region. Some countries refused the quota of 
refugees the European Commission proposed. In the absence of vetting, who could tell who was 
a genuine refugee and who might belong to an extremist group? Muslims and terrorism were 
conflated; Muslim xenophobia became contagious and thus Europe’s conundrum: Muslims as 
potential terrorists; Muslims as needed labor in an aging Europe. Brussels is stymied. The 
quintessence of the EU is the surrender of part of national sovereignty. Now the interests of 
national sovereignties are suddenly taking center place. The sprawling, labyrinthine bureaucracy 
that holds the EU together is fragile at the seams. It works when an agglomeration of national 
interests can produce consensus, no matter how opaque. It creaks to a halt when national interest 
takes precedence. 
There are no antidotes to the suicide bomber, the lone-wolf terrorist, the indigenous 
radicalized or sleeper terrorist cell—all prepared to die or even knowing that they will be killed 
carrying out their terrorist attacks; no safeguards against those who place no value on human life, 
least of all their own. They do not need advanced technology to carry out their acts, putting at 
some disadvantage countries that rely on advanced technologies to secure their safety; the acts of 
terror that elude them take place beneath the most sophisticated security threshold. They have 
mastered the ways to communicate among cells in several sovereign states. They are not only 
extraordinarily elusive; they are recombinant. This is the new reality, for which the affluent 
developed countries have no safeguards other than to slam closed the doors of refuge for 
incoming migrants, guilt by association rapidly displacing reason. Right-wing xenophobes began 
gaining traction in 2015. Right-wing parties, once considered peripheral, were starting to swell 
their ranks and win elections. Faced with an EU at loggerheads with itself over how to 
simultaneously act collectively and act on individual sovereign-state definitions of security, the 
latter prevailed. Member states failed to agree on a migrant-distribution quota system; 
Chancellor Merkel tiptoed to Turkey offering President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan three billion 
euros to keep the teeming hordes at bay. In line with the adage that in the event you cannot solve 
a problem, it’s best to throw money at it, the EU convened a plethora of conferences and 
commissioned a slew of studies. While ISIL and like-minded extremists are unlikely to achieve 
the caliphate they dream of, it may be one of several factors that become instrumental in the 
unraveling of the EU. 
 
Interventions to Slow the Flows of Migrants from the Conflicts That Are 
Their Bedrocks? 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
6 
 
 
No matter how we view history, especially in the post-millennial era, the mindless brutality of 
psychotic dictators, the mass elimination of political opposition in nondemocratic states, internal 
dispositions for ethnic cleansing, and internal conflicts escalate into mass atrocities that cause 
people to flee and set in motion displacement and migration. In the case of the Syrian civil war 
there is a need to develop criteria for just intervention. No sovereign state has the right to murder 
its own citizens. 
How, then, do we balance the rights of sovereign states in a global world that has redefined 
sovereignty and the rights that sovereign states have in a world of increasing interdependencies 
that recognizes the international primacy of human rights? When does oppression reach a point 
where international intervention on humanitarian grounds should give way to forceful 
intervention? There is no single context. It is difficult to make a forceful case for a military 
intervention in Iraq on the ground that Saddam Hussein was ruthlessly exterminating Kurds and 
Shiites. Why stop with overthrowing one ruthless dictator? Besides the destabilization such an 
intervention would bring by triggering perhaps even more repression in neighboring countries, it 
would have required a prior debate to reach consensus on grounds that would justify such an 
intervention, one that would henceforth be universally applied. The major redefinitions of 
international law would have ramifications, difficult to apply and impossible to enforce. 
We are faced with what Kofi Annan once referred to as “problems without passports,” 
which require a serious review of the existing framework for the just use of force. In Syria, the 
case for just intervention is more compelling. 
The United Nations is ill equipped to carry out the very task that is its founding mandate—
the prevention of war. It has tried in various ways to adapt to a post–Cold War era, a unipolar 
world, to a post–9-11 era, a multipolar world, and now to the rise of global jihadist extremisms. 
Member states have been unable to agree that there should be a permanent UN international 
army, thus requiring it to improvise ways to deal with wars. Peacekeeping—never mentioned in 
the charter—had to be invented. For sixty years the United Nations has been the proxy 
battleground for competing ideologies. It is still locked into the decisions or the lack of decision 
by the Security Council. Because the Security Council is unable to agree on any matter that 
would seem to diminish the international standing of one of its members or take any action that 
might be construed as a threat to a member’s national security interests or that might undermine 
the proxy conflicts it supports for strategic interests or upset the balance of power among them, it 
is for the most part moribund and next to useless for accomplishing much in the way of deterring 
intrastate conflicts. 
The UN Charter expressly declares the sanctity of the principle of nonintervention. The 
Security Council has now set limits on that sanctity. The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (lCISS) sets out the principles for international military 
intervention in failed, about to fail, or rogue states where conflict is ready to erupt or has already 
erupted. These principles are the right intention, the last resort, proportional means, and 
reasonable prospect.9 Most important, ICISS was unambiguous in two regards: the principle of 
nonintervention yields to the principle to protect and with intervention comes the principle to 
rebuild. Thus, one of the major consequences of our interdependence is to recognize that a threat 
to peace must now include “the feared adverse international consequences of civil conflicts 
involving humanitarian catastrophes.”10  
Unfortunately, while the goal is high-minded, no state has taken upon itself to intervene in 
another state’s internal conflict no matter how compelling the evidence that one party or another 
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or all parties engage in acts contrary to the Geneva conventions. Nor is an intervention likely 
unless the permanent Security Council countries are on board. In Syria, Russia’s military 
intervention in support of the effort to degrade and destroy ISIL—in reality more of an attempt to 
prop up the Assad regime—a client state hardly meets these criteria. Neither, for that matter does 
the US-led coalition airstrikes on ISIL targets. The United Nations has also addressed the 
question of accountability.  
The projections of most expert institutions suggest that the current migration crisis is only 
the beginning.  There is not a European crisis, there is a global crisis. At some point the rich 
North will have to direct its attention to the countries at the ladder’s lowest rung. The 
commitments must be long-term no matter how faltering and difficult partnerships with the 
countries at the lowest rungs may be; otherwise they will fail. Marginalization incubates itself. 
Globalization that leaves billions of people in perpetual freefall is a prescription for violent 
conflicts, out of which will emerge new terrorist groups with agendas of hate and access to the 
technologies and weapons—to give lethal expression to that hate. 
 
Troubling Question: An Uncertain Future 
 
One critical issue that has largely gone unaddressed is the relationship between poverty and 
violent conflict, the relationship between terrorism and poverty, and the interrelationship 
between the two. Even though we hear the figures frequently, we remain disconnected from their 
far-reaching implications: an estimated nine hundred million people in 2012 were living on less 
than $1.90 a day—the new international poverty line; the projected number for 2015 under the 
new line is seven hundred million people. Poverty also is becoming increasingly concentrated in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Globally more than eight hundred million people are still living in extreme 
poverty.11 
By 2030 the world population will reach 8.5 billion people,12 most of them in the developing 
world, countries of poverty and extreme poverty. An aging West will face an explosion of young 
people elsewhere who face lifetimes of poverty and have little prospect for better lives. Relative 
deprivation and resource deprivation will affect social cohesion among developed and 
developing countries, within and among developing countries, and also within developed 
countries, fostering alienation, exploitation, and dependency—the accoutrements of violence. 
The phenomenon of growing inequality accompanying global economic trade between the 
developed countries in the Northern Hemisphere and the developing countries in the Southern 
Hemisphere and the perception within developing countries that the developed countries (read 
the West) are using trade agreements to advance their interests at the expense of their poorer 
neighbors. A World Bank report argues that “an unequal distribution of wealth exacerbates 
societal tensions,” “increases the perception of relative deprivation,” and “leads to perceived 
grievances and potential strife.”13 Global television feeds the feelings of envy and resentment 
that disparities in income levels generate. Violent conflicts are most likely to occur within 
countries with weak social cohesion, that is, countries where the informal sectors of the economy 
are most pervasive, where surviving and protecting one’s meager assets require guile, alliances 
with gangs, and frequently a resort to violence. In poor and extremely poor countries the 
informal sectors of society are expanding; adherence to such things as the rule of law is a 
misnomer since there is no rule of law, only the excessive consumption of the elites and the petty 
corruption that survival in the informal world necessitates. 
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The link between poverty and terrorism is less demonstrable, but it exists nevertheless. 
Terrorist groups exploit conditions of poverty to expand the political appeal of their cause and 
find fertile ground for nurturing recruits. Yet, the countries most in need of aid for development 
rarely receive it. The limited resources that developed countries are prepared to allocate to 
development aid is given to countries where the infrastructure offers the prospect for a high 
return on the aid they receive, that is, countries already some significant way up the 
developmental ladder. Those countries at the lowest rungs lack the basic capacity to use aid or 
the aid ends up in the coffers of corrupt officials. They have been written off. And therein lies the 
blind eye. 
Unless national security analysts include in their security calculus the link between poverty 
and violent conflict and how poverty creates conditions that are breeding grounds for terrorist 
groups, their analyses of possible terrorist threats will be incomplete and possibly wrong. 
Military power will not “defeat” terrorism; developmental power may. But that calls for a 
reordering of the West’s thinking. Having the populations of the West believe that their countries 
can somehow horde the wealth of the earth without consequence in the face of increasing abject 
poverty among the majority of the world’s population is an invitation to fiddle with apocalypse. 
 
****** 
 
Along with two literary essays, the articles in this issue of the journal address local, national, and 
international public policy questions. On the literary level, one article discusses whether 
arguments from an older era over a white writer’s presumption that he can accurately articulate 
black voices and experiences, itself an unconscious bias, can throw light on racial issues roiling 
college campuses and other arenas of public discourse today; the second, more mellow and 
reflective, ponders the incongruities and congruities that surface when the author explores how 
the meaning of the word home depends on one’s personality as he prepares to move his family 
back to Massachusetts, where he grew up. Three examine questions germane to Massachusetts: 
one on media bias leading up to the referendum in Massachusetts on bilingual education, a 
second on equality of compensation among teachers in different communities in the state, and a 
third on racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the workplace. On the national level, one article 
looks at biases that explain why black women enlist in the U.S. military at higher rates than other 
ethnic and racial groups. And, finally, two articles on the international level. One discusses the 
urgent need to reorient long-term U.S. foreign policy objectives; the other makes an important 
contribution to understanding what might lie ahead in Iraq, if ISIL is defeated—sobering and 
rarely discussed.   
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